Background. In June 2000, the hospital-acquired Clostridium difficile (CD) infection rate in our hospital (University of Pittsburgh Medical Center-Presbyterian, Pittsburgh, PA) increased to 10.4 infections per 1000 hospital discharges (HDs); the annual rate increased from 2.7 infections per 1000 HDs to 7.2 infections per 1000 HDs and was accompanied by an increase in the frequency of severe outcomes. Forty-seven (51%) of 92 HA CD isolates in 2001 were identified as the "epidemic BI strain." A comprehensive CD infection control "bundle" was implemented to control the outbreak of CD infection.
mains the most common cause of hospital-acquired (HA) diarrhea and is responsible for 1300,000 cases per year [1] [2] [3] . An increased number of cases of CDAD has been observed in North America in the past 5 years, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] with rates reported in excess of 20 cases per 1000 hospital admissions [6] . Historically, severe disease (e.g., toxic megacolon, perforation, colectomy, and death) was reported to occur in ∼3% of patients [9, 10] . CD has reemerged as a life-threatening pathogen, and increased frequency of severe outcomes has been reported worldwide [5, 6, 11, 12] . Recent data suggest that a hypervirulent CD strain overproduces toxins A and B in vitro [13] . This strain has been typed as BI by restriction enzyme analysis (REA), as North American PFGE type 1 (NAP1), and as PCR ribotype 027 [8] .
Since 1996, HA CD infection rates at our facility (University of Pittsburgh Medical Center-Presbyterian, Pittsburgh, PA) have ranged from 2.7 infections per 1000 hospital discharges (HDs) to 3.5 infections per 1000 HDs. In June 2000, the HA CD infection rate at our hospital increased to 10.4 infections per 1000 HDs, marking the beginning of the CD infection outbreak in our hospital; this outbreak was ultimately associated with a disproportionate increase in severe cases during the period 2000-2001, with a total of 26 colectomies and 18 deaths being attributable to CD infection (the rate of severe CDAD increased from 0.15 cases per 1000 HDs [5.6%] ) [7] . REA P p .004 typing identified 2 highly related clusters representing 51% of HA CD isolates. Subsequent testing classified the clusters as the BI strain, which was later reported in 6 other health care facilities [8] . Another study performed at our institution assessed the presence of binary toxin in 49 randomly selected CD isolates from the period 2001-2002 [14] . Binary toxin genes were identified in the majority of isolates regardless of outcome. More recently, we conducted a retrospective, matched case-control study that assessed risk factors for CDAD [7] and that molecularly subtyped (by REA) 135 consecutive isolates to determine if an outbreak had occurred. This same group of isolates served as the baseline for the present study.
Barrier precautions for CD infection control have been recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [15, 16] . In addition, various infection-control measures, including environmental cleaning, use of single-use rectal thermometers, endoscope disinfection, and limited use of select antibiotics, have been described in other guidelines [17] [18] [19] . Environmental cleaning with sodium hypochlorite (bleach) solutions decreases CD surface contamination [20] and has been associated with a significant reduction in the number of cases of CDAD [21] .
Since 2000, an outbreak investigation has guided the sequential introduction of control measures and the development of a comprehensive CD infection control "bundle." This article reports the successful control of a CD infection outbreak and a significant reduction in the rate of infection and proportion of the CD BI outbreak strain.
METHODS
The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center-Presbyterian is an 834-bed tertiary care teaching facility. Before the period when the epidemic occurred, there was no obvious change in patient population, infection-control policies, or diagnostic testing for CD infection. Alcohol sanitizer for hand hygiene was introduced in July 2000, 7 months after the CD infection outbreak began.
HA CD Infection Rates
HA CD infection rates were calculated monthly and annually (during the period 1996-2005) and were reported as the number of HA CD infections per 1000 HDs, unless otherwise stated. HA CD infections in patients who developed the infection у72 h after hospital admission were classified using CDC National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System criteria [22] .
Severe HA CDAD Rates
Severe CDAD was defined by the presence of CD infection (positive results of a stool toxin assay or pseudomembranes visualized endoscopically), with resulting colectomy and/or death attributable to CD infection. All potential cases were reviewed by a trained team of health care professionals (4 physicians, 1 pharmacist, and 1 infection-control professional). Agreement of the majority of team members, including у2 physicians, that outcomes were attributable to CD infection was necessary for the classification of severe CDAD. The severe HA CDAD rate was defined in 2 ways: as a percentage of all HA CD infections and as the number of cases of severe HA CDAD per 1000 HDs. The rates were calculated for the period 1999-2005.
CD Infection Control Bundle: Interventions and Timeline
Our CD infection control bundle consisted of education, increased and early case finding methodologies, expanded infection-control measures, development of a CD management team, and targeted antimicrobial management (figure 1).
Education. A standardized CD education module and printable materials for providers and patients were developed in July 2000 and made available electronically. The module was presented at a variety of quality, leadership, nursing liaison, and interdepartmental meetings. It included information on epidemiology, risk factors, clinical findings associated with severe disease, the epidemic strain, control measures, and HA CD infection rates.
Increased and early case finding methodologies and rapid initiation of appropriate therapy. In July 2000, primary care nurses were granted authority to order testing for CD infection, and methods were developed to identify patients at high risk of CD infection using electronic markers to encourage prompt testing and contact precautions. A CD infection email alert was sent from the Medical Director to the attending physician requesting CD infection testing consideration. High-risk patients were defined as follows: (1) mL or with 110% bands, (2) patients readmitted to the hospital within 14 days after hospital discharge with a WBC count 110,000 cells/mL, and (3) patients with previous CDAD. The monthly alert volume was monitored, and a 3-month subset analysis was performed to assess CD infection testing and CD positivity rates.
A CD management team, comprised of infectious diseases clinicians, was established in May 2001. All CD toxin-positive patients were reported and evaluated in near real time. The goal was to assess the severity of illness using a standardized clinical assessment process and to prescribe appropriate therapy. All patients meeting clinical criteria for potentially severe disease were surgically evaluated. Intravenous immunoglobulin therapy was considered when colectomy was imminent.
Expanded infection-control measures. Expanded infection-control measures included environmental cleaning, electronic flags and alerts, hand hygiene with soap and water, prolonged duration of isolation, and infection-control audits.
In July 2000, contact isolation requirements were expanded from the duration of illness [16] to the duration of hospitalization, unless approved by infection control. Informatics tools were developed to facilitate CD isolation. In November 2001, the registration system was used to electronically flag CD-positive patients during index hospitalization and to block placement of patients who were not CD coded to the same room. Concurrently, a CD real-time notification alert was generated from the Laboratory Information System. The program uses incident CD testing results to prompt notification to the current point of patient care via email, fax, printer, and text pager, thus, eliminating isolation implementation delay. Alerts included patient name, location history, isolation requirement (contact precautions) instruction, and an electronic link to the CD education site.
Infection-control audits. Compliance with isolation and hand hygiene was monitored. Rooms where patients with CD infection stayed were audited for 1 month for proper signage and product availability (e.g., soap, gowns, and gloves). Thirty monthly hand hygiene opportunities per patient care area were audited from November 2002 thereafter. During hand hygiene audits, compliance with isolation was also monitored. Generally, 28% of the average daily census required contact precautions (11% because of CD contamination). Infection-control audits were initially conducted by unit-based observers (i.e., nurses or aides who received no special infection control or audit training). In April 2004, unit-based observers were replaced by dedicated independent observers (i.e., nursing students trained by infection-control professionals).
Targeted antimicrobial restriction. Clindamycin, ceftriaxone, and levofloxacin were associated with increased CD infection risk in our case-control analysis of CD infection [7] . A formal antimicrobial management program, which required prior approval by infectious diseases physicians and pharmacists for these and other broad-spectrum antimicrobials, was 
Microbiologic Methods
The presence of CD toxin in a stool specimen was determined using a standard cell culture cytotoxicity assay with MRHF cells (Diagnostic Hybrids) and antitoxin (TechLab). Toxin testing was performed throughout the CD infection outbreak. Culturing for CD began in March 2001 and was accomplished using previously published methods [24] . Historically, only unformed stool specimens were acceptable for testing; however, because it became evident that CD was being identified in patients who did not have diarrhea, both formed and unformed stool samples were accepted.
Molecular Methods
Molecular subtyping was performed for available CD isolates collected from March through December 2001 and from a similar time period in 2005, using a modification of a published method [25] . REA typing was performed for the isolates collected in 2001. REA types were assigned on the basis of visual inspection findings. For REA type classification, the banding pattern had to be indistinguishable from the REA prototype isolate and was confirmed by testing the isolate and the prototype on the same gel.
Isolates 
RESULTS

HA CD Infection Rates
The HA CD infection rate peaked in June 2000 to 10.4 infections per 1000 HDs. The overall CD infection rate in 2000 was 7.2 infections per 1000 HDs, which was more than twice the rate in 1999 (2.7 infections per 1000 HDs) (table 1, figure 1 ). By 2001, the rate decreased to 5.6 infections per 1000 HDs and has since been maintained between 3.0 infections per 1000 HDs and 5.5 infections per 1000 HDs. Overall, the HA CD infection rate decreased significantly from 10.4 infections per 1000 HDs Overall, hand hygiene and barrier compliance rates were 75% and 68%, respectively. Compliance differed significantly by health care worker type, with registered nurses being most compliant when unit-based observer methodology was used but lower when dedicated independent observers were used. Hand hygiene compliance among physicians never exceeded 70% ( figure 1,  table 2) .
CD management team. From May 2001 through December 2005, the CD management team evaluated 1859 patients (mean, 31 patients per month). Of these patients, 211 (11%) met the clinical criteria for potentially severe disease using standardized assessment, and intravenous immunoglobulin therapy was prescribed for 45 (21%) of these patients.
Antimicrobial management program. Overall fluoroquinolone use (assessed as DDDs per 1000 patient days) increased by 40% during the period 1998-1999 (figure 2). Levofloxacin was added to the formulary in 1999. That year, the use of levoflaxacin was 106.2 DDDs per 1000 patient-days; the use increased by 37%, to 145.5 DDDs per 1000 patient-days, in
(
). The use of all CDAD-associated antimicrobials P ! .001 (i.e., clindamycin, ceftriaxone, and fluoroquinolones) peaked at 212.7 DDDs per 1000 patient-days in 2001. Following initiation of the antimicrobial management program, aggregate use of these agents decreased in 2003 by 54% ( ); clin-P ! .001 damycin had the greatest reduction (69%), followed by fluoroquinolones (54%;
). Ceftriaxone use also decreased P ! . REA. Of 135 CD isolates analyzed in 2001, 92 were HA CD isolates. Of these 92 HA CD isolates, 47 (51%) were 2 highly related REA types and 5 (5.4%) represented another unrelated clonal population. REA typing performed at Hines VA Hospital identified the predominant clonal population as BI [8] . In addition, testing at the CDC identified the isolates in this population as toxinotype III, binary toxin positive, with a tcdC deletion-all characteristics of the hypervirulent BI strain [8] . The other clonal population was identified as J9.
MLVA. In 2001, of the 125 isolates analyzed, 102 MLVA types were identified, including 3 clonal complexes determined by minimum spanning tree analysis, with a summed tandem repeat difference р2 (figure 3). The largest complex comprised 50 isolates (40%) (figure 3) and was consistent with the REA BI type. Two smaller complexes, consisting of 8 (6%) and 2 (2%) isolates, corresponded to the J and BK REA groups, respectively ( figure 3) .
In 2005, of the 74 isolates analyzed, 70 MLVA types were identified. Only 1 clonal complex of 10 isolates (13.5%) that were consistent with the BI strain was identified, which was significantly less than the BI strain incidence in 2001 (50 of 126 isolates;
). Three BI MLVA types (65, 97, and 100) P ! .001 from individual patients were detected during both periods (figure 3), demonstrating that the clonal complex determined in 2005 was genetically related to the BI group. In 2001, 36 (72%) of 50 BI isolates were defined as HA, and in 2005, 2 (20%) of 10 BI isolates were HA. REA J and BK types were not detected in 2005.
DISCUSSION
The outbreak of infection with the CD BI strain in our hospital began in 2000. Infection-control measures were initiated, and by 2001, a significant decrease in the HA CD infection rate occurred. A targeted rate of 5.0 infections per 1000 HDs was reached and sustained and was accompanied by a significant reduction in the rate of severe CDAD disease. This may have been because of the documented reduction in the incidence of infection with the BI strain. These data suggest that the CD infection control "bundle" successfully limited the spread of the hypervirulent BI strain in our facility and controlled the outbreak.
Appropriate control measures to curtail outbreaks of CD infection have been debated [27] [28] [29] . Alcohol-based hand sanitizers are thought to be ineffective in controlling CD infection transmission, because they have poor activity against CD spores [30] . This would not explain the spread of CD infection in our hospital, because use of alcohol-based hand sanitizers was not implemented at our facility until after the onset of the CD infection outbreak. Some postulate that increased toxin production and hypersporulation [13, 31] facilitate environmental contamination and contribute to outbreaks of infection and that infection-control measures alone can reduce infection incidence [28, 29] . Others have suggested that formulary modification alone may elicit control of CD infection outbreaks [32] [33] [34] . None of the CD infection outbreaks in these studies involved BI strains. Control measures for this strain may differ from those previously reported. BI strains are resistant to fluoroquinolones. Increased use of these antimicrobial agents is proposed to have contributed to the current CD infection epidemic. Some investigators speculate that gatifloxacin and moxifloxacin pose a greater risk than levofloxacin or ciprofloxacin [35] and that changing the quinolone formulary may be enough to control outbreaks of CD infection [27] . The HA CD infection rate at our hospital significantly decreased in 2001, before the implementation of the antimicrobial management program. In 2005, a formulary switch from levofloxacin to moxifloxacin plus ciprofloxacin resulted in increased overall flouroquinolone use, yet CD infection rates further decreased in 2006. Therefore, blaming antimicrobial agents alone may be too simplistic; however, reducing the use of antimicrobials agents may contribute to sustained low rates of infection. This study demonstrates that a comprehensive infection control "bundle" was associated with rapid and sustainable CD infection control. Although we are unable to determine the contributory effect of each intervention within the bundle, we believe that this management strategy will effectively control the spread of infection with the epidemic BI strain of CD in affected institutions. In addition, early identification, followed by appropriate therapeutic management, may reduce the frequency of adverse events associated with CDAD.
